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Local Economic Development
Incentives in an Era of Globalization:
The Exploitation of Decentralization
and Mobility
Audrey G. McFarlane*
Editors' Note: In 2002, The Urban Lawyer printed a series of articles
from the AALS State and Local Government Section Annual Meeting
Panel, New Developments in State and Local Tax: E-Commerce, Tax
Incentives for Business and Litigation-Generated Revenues. ** At the
time local governments were beginning to feel the financial pinch of
revenue shortfalls. Now, two years later, the situation is even more
grave. Since the beginning of 2003, local newspapers have been filled
with articles evaluating the wisdom of cities large and small that have
mortgaged their financial well being by offering large incentive packages to lure corporations to come to their community or stay within
their community. t
Audrey McFarlane responds to this panel discussion and provides a
closer examination of the realities of business tax incentives.
I. Introduction

THE PANEL TOPIC was relatively straightforward: consider various creative efforts by local government to raise revenues through taxation.
*Audrey G. McFarlane, Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.
**Peter D. Enrich, Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report, 34 URB. LAW. 415
(2002); Janice C. Griffith, State and Local Revenue Enhancement and Taxation Policies
in a Digital Age: E-Commerce Taxation, Business Tax Incentives, and Litigation Generated Revenues, 34 URB. LAW. 429 (2002); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Sales and Use
Taxes on Electronic Commerce: Legal, Economic, Administrative, and Political Issues,
34 URB. LAW. 487 (2002).
t See, e.g., Analisa Nazareno, Wising Up About Development; Even Before Toyota,
City Leaders Had Refined Their Pitches to Potential Employers, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS NEWS, February 22, 2003 (detailing change in the city's Economic Development
Department to a focused, organized, and strategic search for companies that fit within
a specified group of industries known to have favorable growth and certain wage structures); Bob Mims, Shattered Dreams, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., reprinted in PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, March 7, 2003 (discussing millions of dollars in loans and tax incentives the City of Riverton, Utah, granted to Intel Corp. in hopes that the company would
employ over 8,000 in their community, when in fact only 400 are currently employed);
RJ. King, Economy Blunts Impact of Compuware' s Move, THE DETROIT NEWS, March
2,2003 (scaling back its plans, Compuware Corp. will bring 2,000 employees to downtown Detroit as opposed to the 4, I 00 employees it initially promised when it received
more than $70 million in tax breaks).
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The need to raise revenue is self-evident: maintaining community, governing, and providing essential services requires resources. The papers
delivered during this panel were about more than revenue raising,
however. They were about how this essentially local endeavor is taking
place within the context of a globalized economy.! Globalization has
led to unprecedented and rapid mobility through the decentralization
of trade, production, and communication. The challenge to local
governments is how best to cope with this unprecedented mobility and
in particular, how to identify a valid nexus between resources and
taxation.
This response first discusses briefly the common themes raised by
the panelists about the mobility and nexus challenges presented by
globalization. It then comments more extensively on Peter Enrich's
article on the troubling proliferation of state and local business tax
incentives. 2 While I agree that a national approach (whether through
judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause or federal legislative
intervention) looks like it would be helpfuJ,3 I believe the discussion
of this issue should be broadened to look more closely at why state and
local governments offer incentives. Incentives should not simply be
dismissed as arising merely from state and local government officials
acting from corrupt or self-serving motives. On the other hand, the
proliferation of business tax incentives begs a closer examination of
the direction of public resources exclusively toward a narrow, if not
skewed, vision of economic development.
I. Though the term globalization is used often and loosely, it is a useful term for
characterizing a global process of increasing mobility and interconnectedness of trade,
methods of production, communication, and people and capital flowing across national
boundaries regulated only by the limits of technology and publicly unaccountable international trade organizations like the World Trade Organization. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (2d ed. 2000). While
this has not broken down patterns of racial or economic segregation and in fact has
probably enhanced them in new and troublingly intractable ways, the impact on local
governments has been no less considerable.
2. Peter D. Enrich, Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report, 34 URB. LAW. 415
(2002).
3. A commerce clause challenge is ostensibly focused on the distortion of free commerce, it remains to be seen, however, how courts will sort through the difference
between the natural versus the impermissible destructiveness of competition especially
in the face of likely state claims that incentives have allowed them the discretion to
experiment and successfully promote economic development. See, e.g., Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456 (1991) (assessing the benefits of a federalist structure of
government is that it produces "a decentralized government ... more sensitive to diverse needs of a heterogeneous society ... increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes ... allows for more innovation and experimentation in
government; and ... makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.").
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II. Globalization and the Mobility Challenge

Every day trillions of dollars circle the globe in seconds as foreign
investments and currency speculation. Major corporations operate internationally facilitated by satellite communications, the Internet, as
well as by the ability to outsource their production to independent contractors. Domestically, people need not live or shop where they work;
instead they use automobiles, telephones, and computers to conduct the
business of daily life. The three panel presentations dramatically illustrate the challenge that globalization presents for state and local governments that are fixed in place geographically. Each panelist highlighted the different dimensions of the mobility dilemma and challenge.
Charles McLure's exhaustive examination of the appropriate way for
state and local governments to tax internet transactions 4 highlights the
problems raised by transactions that not only take place outside of a
local government's boundaries but often arguably do not take place
anywhere. The geographical nature of many of today's transactions
raises daunting issues regarding the nexus between transactions and
geographical place as well as enforcement problems.
David Gelfand considered the mobility of guns and cities' inability
to close their borders to the influx of illegal weapons. s Gelfand's exploration of manufacturer products liability for the deadly consequences of urban gun violence highlights the ineffectiveness of local
gun prohibitions against the influx of weapons into a city and their use
by those inclined to violence. 6 The all too common media reports about
murders by gun (often causing the resulting injury and devastation to
seem ordinary) makes the notion of product liability as compensation
for cities appealing by offering some action that can be taken.
The balance of this commentary will focus on Peter Enrich's article
about the proliferation of business tax incentives. In many respects this
topic highlights the quintessential local government attempt to meet the
mobility challenge and transcend the limits of a fixed geographical
position in a globalizing world. In this and other work,? Enrich argues,
in effect, that cities and states are losing the mobility challenge. Locked
in a competitive race to the bottom, they offer often staggering grants
4. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Sales and Use Taxes on Electronic Commerce: Legal,
Economic, Administrative and Political Issues, 34 URB. LAW. 487 (2002).
5. David Gelfand, Address at the AALS Annual Meeting, State and Local Government Section Panel (Jan. 5, 2001).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on Business Tax Incentives, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1996).
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of public monies to private corporations in a bid to attract new firms
to relocate or prevent current in-state firms from leaving. 8 Enrich compellingly demonstrates the excesses that accompany the bargains made
by cities and mobile business entities as certain firms use their mobility
to exploit interstate and intercity competition for business. The transfer
of substantial amounts of public dollars into the hands of private corporations is troubling. As Enrich notes, often these public dollars are
transferred for relocations that a corporation might have made anyway.9
Moreover, what results, at best, is not job creation but job relocation
from one area in the United States to another. Io Enrich argues that use
of business tax incentives to direct commerce into a state in this manner
violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution." Enrich's proposal, which is provocative from a local government scholar's perspective, that federal courts must intervene to protect state and local
governments enthralled in a seemingly inescapable, self-destructive,
zero-sum inter-city and inter-state competition. 12 Enrich posits correctly
that many public officials feel they have no other choice when faced
with competition from other states and localities that are offering incentives. Local politicians are often anxious to appear to provide jobs
for constituents in order to reinforce their own political positions. While
I agree with Professor Enrich's considered reasoning on the merits and
viability of a Commerce Clause challenge,I3 it is helpful to consider
further the actual context within which state and local governments
offer business incentives in order to expand our understanding of why
courts, state or federal, might have difficulty invalidating business incentives.
8. A number of mechanisms or forms of assistance exist: (I) real property tax
abatement or exemption; (2) low interest loans or loan guarantees; (3) direct grants;
(4) sales tax and franchise tax exemptions; (5) mortgage recording tax exemptions; (6)
subsidized energy costs; (7) tax-exempt bond financing; (8) below-market lease rates;
(9) public improvements that benefit the project; (10) use or threatened use of eminent
domain to assist assemblage; and (II) special zoning variances that allow larger projects or use variations. Martin E. Gold, Economic Development Projects: A Perspective,
19 URB. LAW. 193 (1987).
9. Enrich, supra note 2, at 416.
10. Enrich, supra note 2, at 416.
II. Enrich, supra note 2, at 415; U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. I, § 8.
12. See generally Peter D. Enrich, Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report, 34
URB. LAW. 415 (2002).
13. But see Christopher R. Drahozal, Preserving the American Common Market:
State and Local Governments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 233,244 (1999) (arguing that the empirical data shows that Supreme Court is
unlikely to strike down dormant Commerce Clause challenges unless other states join
the challenge); Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent
to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379 (1998).
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We should consider that economic development is one of the endeavors of local government to provide for the common good. While
the warlike metaphor of competition between states and cities to lure
or retain businesses is an essential characterization, it is limited in its
usefulness for understanding the context within which business incentives operate. In particular, the metaphor of competition looks outward
for an understanding of incentives but fails to look inward at a particular
local government's motivation to offer such incentives. Another metaphor, "good housekeeping" is illustrative: state and local officials are
responsible for overseeing the orderly development of the metropolitan
area. Since local governments depend on the presence of residents who
must be employed, it has become part of local government's responsibility to ensure that such residents and employers are provided a clean
and hospitable environment in which to reside and operate. Facilitating
local development through tax or other incentives are part of a collection of tools that local government's "good housekeeping" and hospitality supplies. 14 In other words, incentives satisfy a psychological need
as well as a political one: they give the impression to state and local
officials that they are doing something; they have the power and ability
to actually take control of or respond to the mobility challenge regardless of whether or not this is truly the case.
III. The Long-Standing Use of Business Incentives

This is not the first time that the question has arisen of if and how local
governments should be constrained in their attempt to provide for their
future development. State and local government promotion and support
of business, as well as the actual conduct of business enterprises, have
been fixtures of the history of state and local government. Beginning
in the 1790s states actively promoted economic development (or, as it
was termed then, "internal improvements") through investment in in14. Indeed, business incentives may have no other appeal or motivation other than
an emotional one: state and local government officials know that it feels good to get a
tax break. I speak from related personal experience because I received an incentive
when I decided to move into the City of Baltimore. Even though I had independently
made my decision to move, it felt good to receive a modest grant to reduce settlement
costs from a city-sponsored program. I felt that the welcome wagon had been rolled
out and felt reassured that I had made a good decision. Similarly, I imagine that business
executives who are considering where to locate their businesses or where to stay in
some ways seek and receive incentives as part of an emotional communication that the
city is hospitable and to reassure the corporate decision-maker that its business is
welcome and the city will be responsive to its needs. The state or local government
signals that the company has made the right decision in choosing to remain in or
relocate to their jurisdiction.
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frastructure and transportation, legal innovation to promote corporations and banks as well as engaging in the sale of land. 15 Of course,
such investment could and did take the form of business incentives
such as tax exemptions, state chartering of companies or subscriptions
for direct public ownership of stock in private corporations. 16 Local
governments became more heavily involved in "internal improvement"
during the 1840s, making "most of the important infrastructure investments in education, highways, water systems, sewer systems and public
utilities."17
The mid-nineteenth century rivalry between cities competing first for
canals and then for railroads resulted in the amassing of incredible
amounts of debt to lure the railroads to a particular locality through
public investment in construction, grant of state powers of eminent
domain, and outright grants of public funds. IS The need to go to these
lengths seemed real: cities that failed to get the railroads no longer
exist. 19
The result was a series of debt crises, often with international significance. Local governments either defaulted or came perilously close
to defaulting on repayment of bonds that often had European investors
who failed to understand that, under the federal system of government,
the bonds did not have the full faith and credit of the United States. 20
The nineteenth century legal response was twofold. First, state courts
began to interpret the new and existing doctrines and provisions to
prohibit state government from interacting with private business by
developing and applying the public purpose doctrine to restrict state
and local use of the taxing power 21 and indirectly the spending power,
and the eminent domain power. Second, legislatures amended their state
15. John Joseph Wallis, American Government Finance in the Long Run: 1790 to
1990, 141. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 61, 62 (Winter 2000).
16. See Jennifer L. Gilbert, Selling the City Without Selling Out: New Legislation
on Development Incentives Emphasizes Accountability, 27 URB. LAW. 427,428 (1995)
(observing that as early as 1791, Alexander Hamilton obtained a tax exemption from
the state of New Jersey).
17. Wallis, supra note 15, at 62.
18. Wallis, supra note 15, at 66-68; JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN
LAW 20-21 (200 I).
19. ALBERTA M. SBRAGIA, DEBT WISH: ENTREPRENEURIAL CiTIES, U.S. FEDERALISM, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 48-50 (Bert A. Rockan ed., University of Pittsburgh Press 1996) (noting the demise of Sandusky, Ohio; Leavenworth, Missouri; and
Galena and Park City, Kansas).
20. Jd. at 37, 39-40.
21. Dale F. Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation Provisions and the Public Purpose
Doctrine, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 143, 148 (1993). See Sharpless v. Mayor of
Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853) (one of the earliest cases utilizing the public purpose
doctrine).
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constitutions to institute constitutional debt limits, prohibit gifts of public funds, and specify that taxation must be for public purposes.
Throughout the twentieth century, the federal government played a substantial role in initiating and supporting economic development and, as
compared to the nineteenth century, state and local government interaction with business receded, although never disappeared. 22 When federal support began to decline in the 1970s, states and local governments
again took up the mantle of interacting closely with private business to
ensure a business presence within their jurisdictions. 23 One might think
that since the nineteenth century doctrines and constitutional provisions
are still in place, states already have institutionalized a state-based curb
on excessive business tax incentives. In fact the opposite is true; state
doctrines are often insufficient to curb excessive business tax and other
economic development incentives to private entities.
IV. Inadequacy of State Doctrine Against Excessive Use of Business
Incentives in Face of the Mystical Nature of Economic Development

Ostensibly, state constitutions provide local citizens and courts considerable legal tools at their disposal to police and challenge incentives.
As it turns out, however, these long-standing doctrines and constitutionallimitations that are directly designed and intended to address the
current problem are presently not enforced. In fact their evasion is an
accepted, albeit bizarre, aspect of state and local government law. 24
Moreover, the current understanding of economic development (even
if it means substantial transfers of public money to subsidize private
corporate activity) is that such activity fulfills a public purpose. If a
claimant challenges a business incentive as an expenditure of revenue
received through taxation as not being for a valid public purpose, a
court is likely to uphold the validity of the incentive under most cir22. See Gregory Squires, Partnership and the Pursuit of the Private City. in MARK
GOfrDIENER & CHRIS PICKVANCE, URBAN LIFE IN TRANSITION 196-98 (1991) (attributing increased local government participation in public/private partnership in pursuit of economic development to the decline in federal revenues).
23. See Bruce J. Casino, Federal Grants·in·Aid: Evolution. Crisis. and Future. 20
URB. LAW. 25 (1988) (discussing impact of reduction in federal grants-in-aid on state
and local governments); See generally PETER K. EISINGER, THE RISE OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: STATE AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES 3-6 (1988).
24. See SBRAGlA supra note 19, at 118-21, 135-36 (discussing the use of the revenue bond and public authorities to circumvent state constitutional debt limits); DENNIS
ZIMMERMAN, THE PRIVATE USE OF TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: CONTROLLING PUBLIC SUBSIDY OF PRIVATE ACTIVITY (1991). See. e.g .. Mun. Bldg. Auth. of Iron County Utah
v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985) (approving construction of jail facilities financed
by revenue bonds following voter disapproval of issuance of general obligation bonds).
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cumstances. 25 If an incentive is challenged as a gift of public funds to
a private entity, most courts will uphold the incentive as having a benefit
to the general public. 26 If an exercise of eminent domain on behalf of
a private developer or corporation is chaIlenged for taking of property
not for a public purpose, the exercise will likely be upheld as having a
public purpose. 27 Public purpose has been and wiII continue to be read
broadly, and this is probably a correct interpretation. Any activity with
private benefit may be deemed by a court or a legislature to have public
benefit. A distinct substantive line delineating public from private has
proved very difficult to draw in the abstract.
The real reason, however, is that public purpose requires a substantive evaluation based on a judge's personal opinion about the validity
of the underlying activity. Courts are loathe to second-guess many legislative decisions but in particular decisions that have "economic development" as their underlying justification. Even in the extreme cases,
like Toledo's proposed deal with Daimler-Chrysler,28 how can the court
say that in the future, the deal, as lopsided as it is, will not work out
or at least be publicly perceived to have had some benefit, albeit an
expensive one? Even though incentives have not been proven directly
to cause the promised benefits, who wishes to be the first to claim that
the next set of incentives would not have the promised effect? State
judges, particularly elected ones, could be said to have self-interested
motives, which means they would never want to challenge economic
development incentives. But even judges acting from purely selfless
motives would be hard pressed to overturn incentives as not fulfilling
a valid public purpose.
The reason for judicial deference is that a narrative or discourse of
economic development plays a substantial role in the ineffectiveness of
the public purpose clauses or doctrine as a method for policing business
incentives. Aided by a discourse or narrative of economic development
25. See, e.g., Maready v. Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. 1996) (upholding
constitutionality of economic development incentive grants as satisfying the need for
taxation to be for a public purpose).
26. See, e.g., CLEAN v. City of Spokane, 947 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Wash. 1997) (public
financing of privately-owned retail store parking garage upheld as having adequate
consideration to satisfy prohibition on gift of public funds).
27. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954) (approving the use of eminent domain to transfer private property to private developers; fighting urban blight is
a valid public purpose); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981) (approving use of eminent domain to transfer residential
property to auto company; promoting economic development and combating unemployment is a valid public purpose).
28. See Peter D. Enrich, Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report, 34 URB. LAW.
415 (2002).
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that relies on tenns like "business-friendly," "public-private partnership," and "empowennent,"29 public officials use these tenns, along
with the positive and unchallengeable associations these words evoke,
to channel the definition and understanding of the public need and
interest into the need to do whatever it takes, incentives and all, toward
the imperative to promote growth. 3D Use of the tenn "discourse" is at
once a way of describing a set of practices as well as identifying the
effect that these practices have. The practices involve a dialogue, a set
of activities and thought surrounding "development" that do not allow
other thoughts (such as social development separate and apart from an
economic justification) or seemingly contradictory actions (such as
public participation in economic development decision-making) to take
place within the public realm. The effect is to marginalize to the sidelines of public discussion or debate other equally important concerns
or needs as competing realities that challenge the benefits of economic
development.
For example, if we were to look beyond the discourse of economic
development we might observe that local economic development is
specifically structured to meet the high-end employment, service, entertainment, and shopping needs of the "global elite." The types of jobs
attracted often are filled by existing employees who transfer with the
company or require skills and education that do not benefit unemployed
or underemployed low-income residents of a particular areaY To the
extent economic development involves redevelopment, the emphasis is
often on luxury hotels, sports complexes, festival market places, and
convention centers.
Also, economic development tends to take part in an elite-dominated
29. See Tim Richardson & Ole B. Jensen, Discourses of Mobility and Polycentric
Development: A Contested View of European Spatial Planning. 8 EUROPEAN PLANNING
STUD. 503. 504 (2000); Rob Atkinson, Discourses of Partnership and Empowerment
in Contemporary British Urban Regeneration. 36 URB. STUD. 59, 60 (1999); David
Wilson, Metaphors. Growth Coalition Discourses and Black Poverty Neighborhoods
in a U.S. City. 28 ANTIPODE 72, 73 (1996) (analyzing the metaphors used in "growth"
discourse in urban development).
30. Also, once you make the claim that an activity is related to "development" of
any sort, the very word itself stands for favorable change. Webster's dictionary defines
it as moving from "inferior to the superior [and] from worse to better." Add in the term
economic and the positive association is irrefutable. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 618 (1961).
31. See TIMOTHY J. BARTIK, WHO BENEFITS FROM STATE AND LOCAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES? 192 (1991) (arguing that local economic development incentives may be justified when pursued by high unemployment areas but are to be
deplored when pursued by low unemployment areas); TIMOTHY J. BARTIK, JOBS FOR
THE POOR: CAN LABOR DEMAND POLICIES HELP? 249-86 (2001) (suggesting that
national incentives could encourage on-the-job skills enhancement and training).
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and privatized decision-making process in which avenues for citizen
input are rare. Notwithstanding these undeniable facts, economic development continues to operate unabated to the benefit of the few and
the comparatively well-off. Until courts perceive a crisis with similar
dimensions to the nineteenth century debt crisis context, in which they
feel a need to intervene to prevent rampant corruption or bad faith
dealing, business incentives will continue to satisfy the public purpose
requirement. 32 The public purpose and constitutional-aid provisions and
doctrines were adopted at the time when the perception was of "public
plunder by private entities."33 Today, the perception is that publicprivate partnerships are beneficial, if not inevitable. The legacy of
public-private partnerships is that the private renders the public legitimate. In an odd way it seems that private enterprise and business legitimizes public government.
V. The Global Context: Decentralization Leads to
Exploitation in a Mobile Economy
The real issue we have to face in the overuse of business incentives is
to acknowledge that we have decentralized economic decision-making
without recognizing the exploitative potential of hyper-mobile capital
and fixed cities. In this respect, perhaps local governments should be
given a bit more credit for the basis of their economic development
decision-making. If businesses are mobile then what choice do they
have? A strong argument could be made that state and local governments should only serve as suppliers and providers of infrastructure,
i.e., roads, utilities, and an educated workforce. But as long as one or
a few states or cities make the money available, mobile corporations
will be able to exploit the resulting vulnerability.
The problem is also lack of public accountability. Economic development is carried out through a set of privatized structures and processes designed primarily, if not exclusively, to meet the needs of business elites and encourage capital investment in particular geographic
areas to promote growth and increase in land prices and rents. 34 That
process is designed to be quickly responsive, private, and shielded from
32. See, e.g., City of Springfield v. Dreison Investments Inc., No. 1999-1318,991230, 2000 WL 782971 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000) (invalidating exercise of eminent
domain for economic development purposes for failing to meet public purpose standard).
33. Rubin, supra note 21, at 166.
34. See JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 62, 73 (1987).
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public scrutiny.35 This is accomplished through elites wielding informal
channels of power as well as quasi-private government entities such as
public authorities that operate free from public scrutiny.36
Contractual accountability agreements are somewhat appealing but
Enrich notes quite correctly that as an overall solution to tax incentive
abuse they probably will not work. 3? States can and should mandate
their use, and mandate that incentives cannot be granted unless certain
guarantees are made or benchmarks are reached. The problem is that
accountability threatens to negate the attractiveness of the incentives
because cities still face the competition problem. Any corporation that
is held to a strict accountability standard could use this as a basis for a
threat to leave. In particular, contractual accounting agreements cannot
work when the city is against the ropes financially. But in the mean
time, they could perhaps have a limited value as a political tool. For
example, claiming that a corporation violated an agreement would at
least be bad publicity for a company. The increasing use of accountability agreements also suggests that states are attempting to eliminate
some of the lopsidedness in the incentive arrangements. The fact that
states or cities are even willing to place an accountability document
before a company suggests some giveaways or public subsidies are
beginning to "smell." Finally, these agreements are potentially quite
useful in those few geographic areas that offer a unique or special
characteristic that the corporation will not pass up merely because the
state stands up for itself.
VI. Conclusion-Redefine the Definition of Development

Business tax incentives, as well as other incentives, are an outgrowth
of decentralized state and local competition. But they should also be
seen as a way to take an active role in local "good housekeeping." If
mobile companies are exploiting this decentralized form of managing
local economic development, we may want to consider how to discourage this exploitation by making it less attractive without eliminating local flexibility initiative. One way might be to address the
35. See MATTHIAS STIEFEL & MARSHALL WOLFE, A VOICE FOR THE EXCLUDED:
POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT, UTOPIA OR NECESSITY? \0 (1994) ("The
characteristic contemporary patterns of economic growth, of modernization, and of
nation-building, all have strongly anti-participatory traits.").
36. See ROGER G. NOLL & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES: THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS (1997) (discussing the use of
publicly unaccountable stadium authorities to finance, construct and operate the recent
proliferation of sports stadiums).
37. Enrich, supra note 2, at 425.
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public accountability issue by encouraging the expansion of citizen
participation in economic development decision-making. Not only
would this involve public oversight but would truly make the grant
of public money come with public strings attached. In some ways,
this suggestion is a cynical one because I do not believe the specter
of hearings, meetings, and the often cumbersome features of direct
democracy would be considered desirable. But it makes the point that
the states themselves are not the sole cause of the problem and perhaps
reducing the attractiveness of business tax incentives is a worthwhile
approach to consider.
If the past is any predictor of the future, the geographical limits to
mobility will continue to fade. The need to continue to think about
local government in the context of globalization will increase. Norms
and standards for appropriate state and local responses to globalization
have and will continue to evolve. An economic development watchdog
group has prepared guidelines for how economic development should
be done. 38 Instead of paying cash to corporations or foregoing tax revenues, the better approach is to focus on educating and training a state's
citizens as well as making the environment a safe and attractive place
to live with amenities that would be attractive to the type of personnel
employed by business corporations. Therefore, more important than
eliminating business tax incentives is to ensure that development is
conceived and undertaken with the interests of all current residents in
mind resulting in development and amenities that suit the needs of a
cross section of residents, not just the very top. This is not currently
the case.

38. William Schwenke, Improving Your Business Climate: A Guide to Smarter Public Investments in Economic Development, available at http://www.cfed.org/main/
econDevlbi/main/newdirectionlImprovClimate.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2003) (advocating an alternate definition of a good business climate based on education, physical
infrastructure, regulation, taxation, business modernization and entrepreneurship).

